This page outlines the history of the Middle East leading up to the creation of Israel's nuclear program. This covers a lot of ground, so there are links to additional information. European powers played a major role in how the Middle East evolved, with their secret treaties to overthrow governments.
This is an ongoing project. Additional information is added as resources become available.
Much of this history centers on the territories included in this map.
1888—Convention of Constantinople

of Egypt
In 1888, a treaty was signed by the UK, German Empire, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire concerning the use of the Suez Canal. The treaty ensured right of passage through the Canal for all signatory countries during times of peace and war.
The canal passed through the Knedivate of Egypt, an autonomous tributary state of the Ottoman Empire, but it had little jurisdiction over the canal. The UK was in control of the canal because the leader of Egypt, Isma'il Pasha (also known as Ismail the Magnificent), sold the UK its shares in the Suez Canal Company.
Wikipedia: Convention of Constantinople
1916—Sykes–Picot Agreement
This was a secret treaty between the UK, France, Russia, and Italy to agree on how they would carve up the Ottoman Empire once they defeated it. See the Triple Entente for details of how they would achieve this.
Wikipedia: Sykes–Picot Agreement
VIDEO: Sykes-Picot: How and why Britain carved up the Arab world
1956—Straits of Tiran closure
Israel's port city of Eilat is on the Gulf of Aqaba, which allows access to the Red Sea through the Strait of Tiran. Eilat's port was built starting in 1952 and was able to accept ocean-going vessels in 1956. Egypt blocked Israeli ships from passing through the strait in response to Operation Black Arrow and Operation Elkayam.
Wikipedia: Israeli passage through the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran
1956—Suez Crisis

1956—Protocol of Sèvres

President of Egypt
Between October 22-24, 1956, the governments of Israel, France, and the UK held secret meetings about removing Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser from power. The plan was to have Israel invade Egypt in the Sinai, and Britain and France would then invade on the pretext of protecting the Suez Canal.
This planning and agreement was known as the Protocol of Sèvres.
1958—Soreq Nuclear Research Center
The Soreq Nuclear Research Center was established in 1958 around Israel's first research reactor. It is located in Yavne, Israel, less than ten miles south of Tel Aviv. It is adjacent to Palmachim Airbase, but the airbase was built aferward, about a decade later.

Wikipedia: Soreq Nuclear Research Center
1960—The Dimona Reactor
On September 17, 1956, France agreed to sell Israel a research reactor and to supply uranium to fuel it. This was to become the Dimona Reactor that was part of the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Construction of the reactor would begin around March 1960.

On March 10, 1960, Israel’s Prime Minister Ben-Gurion met with President Eisenhower at the White House. Ben-Gurion said nothing about the reactor to Eisenhower or to anyone at the State Department.
Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center
1960—John McCone on Meet the Press
On December 12, 1960, Atomic Energy Commission commissioner John McCone appeared on Meet the Press. He was asked about Israel's nuclear program by Arthur Krock of the New York Times.

AEC

NY Times
Here's the audio of that exchange. The reactor that Krock was referring to is the one installed at Dimona, Israel.
1960—Ben-Gurion Knesset Address
On December 21, 1960, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion announced to the Knesset the construction of the nuclear reactor in Dimona. He said the reactor was for peaceful puroposes. He did not mention that the reactor was to be built with help from the French.
Some claim that this address was forced by John McCone's appearance on Meet The Press nine days earlier.
1960—Ambassador Ogden Reid cable
On January 5, 1960, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Ogden Reid sent a cable (telegram) to the State Department describing conversations he had with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion about Israel's nuclear program.

US Ambassador

Prime Minister
The cable
U.S. Embassy Israel Telegram 626 to Department of State, 5 January 1961>Secret, Excised copy, under appeal
Department of State
From: Tel Aviv
To: Secretary of State
No: 626, January 5, 6 p.m. (section one of five)
NIACT
EYES ONLY SECRETARY
reference embassy telegram 615 EYES ONLY SECRETARY.
At Ben-Gurion's request I called on him January 4 in Tel Aviv as he had prior engagement January 3 which precluded provided detailed answers expected reference telegram.
First, Ben-Gurion indicated he wished to answer the question (department telegram 502, 6e) "Can Israel state categorically that it has no plans for producing nuclear weapons?"
Ben-Gurion said: "The reply is a categorical yes. I made it perfectly clear in my statement in the Knesset and our Ambassador made it clear to the Secretary of State."
Then saying he was sorry, officially and personally, to have to say some additional things -- he launched into the following:
"I know the greatness of America; that it is the land of refuge for tens of millions of people of Europe; that it may be the most prosperous country; that your people conduct a bitter war to abolish African slavery; that you saved Europe twice from the Germans. I know you are the leader of the free world; that on America's guidance rests the future of humanity.
"More than this the second president of the US John Adams in 1818, wrote a remarkable letter to Major Mordechai Noah saying: (a) "I really wish the Jews (were once) again in Judea as an independent nation. I wish your nation to be admitted to all the privileges of nations".
"I know President Wilson was the co-creator of the Balfour Declaration -- without him it would not have been possible, that the American Congress took a position favoring the "Jewish national home". Truman was the first to recognize Israel; one or two hours after the creation of the state.
"I know you are a great country."
"However, we are the equals of America in terms of moral respect. You inherited much from us. You should love truth and peace -- one of the most dearest things to me and our people.
Then drawing himself up in his chair, Ben-Gurion said: "We didn't deserve it and we will not accept such treatment."
Here, in chronological order he referred to Ambassador Harman's being called in by the Secretary on December 9 coincident my cable on talk with Bergmann (embassy telegram 486); the story appearing in the Daily Express on December 16 in London which had "news we are creating the atomic bomb"; and particularly to the events of December 18.
Re latter, he said "Our Ambassador approached assistant Secretary Jones that morning" referring to press reports (stating) "American officials have learned Israel is developing a reactor secretly". "Harman called Jones"; noted AEC chairman "McCone will speak on radio at six 0'clock"; and urged that McCone "not encourage speculations and false news." Ben-Gurion said that Jones had replied to the effect that he "hopes McCone" will act "in accordance with the line adopted."
Continuing, Ben-Gurion said "But Mr McCone publicly declared the US government approached Israel for additional information -- that reactor was surprise to the US." Ben-Gurion added "The day after, Monday, the New York Times published an article on partnership of Israel and France in this matter."
Ben-Gurion then referred to his statement in the Knesset saying "When I make a statement in our parliament this (statement) as trustworthy as any made by highest officials in your government. It can be treated only as such when I say something it is just as true -- as morally we are equal.
"We are not a satellite of America. We are and will never be a satellite. We are an independent and proud nation.
Next, he referred to department's statement of December 22 which he called "a nice statement", and one that indicated that "everything so far published not a reason for worry."
At this point, Ben-Gurion returned to the remaining questions. He said, "They are a little strange but I will answer them." He referred to my call on him December 24 (embassy telegram 577) indicating that he said at that time "There will be no plutonium for three or four years -- until reactor made active."
Specifically, with reference to the question (6-a): "What are present Israel plans for disposing of plutonium which will be bred in new reactor?", he said the following: "I told you from our phosphates we can produce uranium. But no country is selling uranium -- only if it gets plutonium; only if it will get it back." Ben-Gurion noted that "As far as we know" this is a condition when we "come to purchase it." as to the purchase date of this uranium, Ben-Gurion noted it would depend on the "rate of work" at the reactor. He then added "at least for that reactor, if I am not mistaken, we need fifty times as much as we can produce." He said this was a large amount and mentioned, partially under his breath, a figure of 80 tons which he was not sure of. In response to my further query, he said "no" plutonium now in Israel.
With reference to question 6-b "Will Israel agree to adequate safeguards with respect to plutonium produced?" Ben-Gurion said flatly: I refuse; We don't want the Russians coming in as part of an international body. I referred to Secretary Herter's stating that the question of disposition of plutonium was the crux of safeguards and again noted that Israel had voted for IAEA safeguards at the general conference in September. Ben-Gurion said: "If you mean international safeguards same law should apply for everybody." He said that there were no safeguards in India. I noted it was our understanding that the Indian reactor was "completely in the open".
Second, I returned to the question of safeguards asking why if the reactor at Nahal Rubin under safeguards was there any "difference" with the reactor at Dimona, which he unequivocally stated was designed for peaceful purposes. My inquiries were without result as each time Ben-Gurion went into the differences between the research work of the two reactors touching again on the history and the purpose of the Dimona reactor. His final comment -- which was not relevant to the question of safeguards -- was that a "group of people gave money to help establish the reactor" for the eventual development of atomic power which may be "cheaper and better" than power resulting from conventional fuels.
Turning to 6-c: "Will Israel permit qualified scientists from IAEA or other friendly quarters visit new reactor and if so what will be the earliest date?", Ben-Gurion said: "We will not permit international bodies to inspect reactor until all reactors are treated as equals." to the second part of the question Ben-Gurion answered "From friendly power, yes." He then placed two conditions on his answer (a) access to a friendly power would be dependent on "our (GOI's) success in quieting public opinion here" and (b) if we have "reason to believe" that what McCone "has done" will not happen again. (several times throughout the discussion Ben-Gurion returned to McCone noting that perhaps McCone had "not made (statement) purposely" and perhaps he did not realize "great harm" might be caused by this statement. He also alluded two more times to Harman - Jones conversation re McCone indicating that USG in effect "gave us a promise not to talk this way."
Ben-Gurion noted that an advance notice question had been presented to him by Knesset member, not of his party, which he said aimed at creating impression "of America as an enemy". He said he would do what he could "to prevent" question coming up but that he might not be successful. If asked, he said he would do everything possible to dispel impression that "the leakage" was done on purpose by the US to "prevent assistance" to the reactor. Ben-Gurion said "I don't want our people to assume any bad intentions on the part of America, and I can assure you I will keep the faith of our people in your nation.
I stressed that the Secretary had sought privacy and as far as I knew there was absolutely no truth in such a charge.
I then asked Ben-Gurion when he would permit a "qualified" scientist to visit the reactor and after some discussion he finally agreed to permit visit "as early as possible" subject to two conditions above.
He made point of saying that here he was really referring to "one of your people". I asked if this visit would be completely "free and open", he said "Yes".
During discussion of this general question I referred to newspaper experience which suggested that early, prompt, and full disclosure of facts on which there was any speculation was the quickest and easiest way to allay any concern, I again tried to distinguish between the reactor at Nahal Rubin and Dimona with no result other than his previous position re Soviets or specifically, possibility of Ambassador Bebrov asking for access.
Finally, with reference to question 6d: "Is a third reactor either in the construction or planning stage? He said no and that our question re "third reactor for time being not overstatement." Ben-Gurion said with a smile it would take at least "ten years to build an atomic power station" but that he did not wish to mislead in any way. While true now that there was not any "construction or planning" for a third reactor, it was not too big a jump from "hoping to planning" at "a little distance".
During balance of discussion Ben-Gurion referred to "what was done by McCone" resulting in the "deterioration of the atmosphere" in the Middle East; Nasser's possible mobilization of four million men; (he didn't "know" whether Nasser would or not) the difference in our defense problem and any defense problem in the world". He paused for emphasis and said: "If Nasser wins, every Jew will be exterminated in this country." Ben-Gurion added: "We would like your people to understand our people and we don't want Nasser to get excited."
He then alluded to a conversation he had had with an American official to the effect that if "worst comes to worst America will help you." To this Ben-Gurion brought up his oft repeated theme "It will be too late". Stressing "our only aim is to prevent war in the Middle East", he returned again to his conversation with the Secretary re a certain "defensive weapon" and his having "reason" to believe after talking with Secretary that Israel "may get it".
He also referred to his admiration for the president as a man of peace; and to special envoy president had sent to area (presumably Anderson) but noted that situation now was "worse than before".
Next he brought up subject of "spying". He said he knew Israel being spied on by Russians, Romanians and Hungarians, but he believed until recently that because of the "relations" between Israel and the US it "was not necessary to be spied on by Americans." He said if this was true he hoped it would be stopped. He volunteered: "You can get everything from us."
Then addressing myself to Ben-Gurion's initial comments, I noted that the Secretary had made point at December 9 meeting that we wished only full and frank discussions on this matter in accordance with manner in which we accustomed to deal. I emphasized both president and Secretary deeply believed in working with other countries as equals and consistent with clear moral principles; that one of principale reasons President Eisenhower ran for office in 1952 was his concern for peace; that no man was more dedicated to peace.
I said that what I was about to say in addition was largely personal although I had said it privately and in some cases publicly; namely that both our countries shared common beliefs in human dignity and the principles of democracy.
Further, I had been impressed by the great progress in Israel; that relations between our two countries were important; it was not a question of size. indeed, I had admired the spirit of halutziyut (pioneering) in Israel and the sense of humanity which was part of Israel's effort to work with newly emerging nations in Africa and Asia to further their rising expectations for a better life in freedom. BG said he very appreciative my remarks.
At the end of the conversation we discussed the spying question alone including the activities of military attaches and reported overflights of U-2. Re latter, I said I had not been officially informed nor had I ever asked whether a U-2 had been over Israel. Ben-Gurion inferred that he thought the pictures the US had in its possession or had shown to Ambassador Harman might be aerial photographs. I said the only photographs I knew of were taken from the public highway--which not prohibited and in fact, I had not known about them until after they were taken. Further, I said that I took full responsibility for the activities of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx the attaches. I could assure him there was no spying going on. Indeed, the attaches, under my instructions, had been scrupulous in contacting the FLO and in reporting matters only as it was appropriate for them to do so.
Ben Gurion said he fully accepted and placed confidence in what I said and was relieved to hear directly from me on this point. I think this question--at least with Ben-Gurion has been largely or wholly laid to rest.
As Ben-Gurion had questioned some things US had done, I noted that knowledge of Dimona reactor had been in one form or another quite widespread; that the press in other countries not unalert; and finally that on at least seven occasions the FLO office and officials of his government had referred to the installation as a textile or metallurgical plant. Ben-Gurion somewhat lamely said--"Well, they did not know". In addition, I told him we bad been seriously trying to build a working relationship between our two countries--that a number of our officers were studying Hebrew--but this climate of understanding had not been helped by the GOI's violation of two agreements one ggsn* or by the GOI's failure to inform us of the reactor--particularly in light of the economic assistance we bad been providing. Re FL-480 I noted that while this unrelated to matter at hand I thought Eshkol and Dayan and the new negotiations committee would make progress on realistic programs for the future-- which would be understood from top to bottom of both governments, Ben-Gurion made note of this and I think other points registered.
Comment: First my apologies over the length of the cable. However, the main points and the sense of the meeting seemed worth reporting completely.
Ben-Gurion feels that he has provided assurances re question 6a, 6e, and 6d and he is well aware that he has answered 6b with a flat negative--at least for the time being--and that on 6c he has agreed to only the second part of question under two conditions. This offer I believe, provides the best hopes for inspection particularly by US scientists--although in earlier discussion Ben-Gurion agreed to inspection by qualified scientist from friendly power. Re timing this visit I believe it can be worked oμt relatively soon unless Knesset debate flares up and provided department explains somewhat more fully--as appropriate--circumstances of McCone answer on TV press query--and Jones comment to Harman. Latter seemed clear to me---but somewhat characteristically Ben-Gurion has taken it as promise, as he did Secretary's comments re a defensive weapon; in spite of a caveat at the time and my reference thereto shortly upon his return.
* as received. will service upon request.
The facts on the U-2 should probably be spelled out -- if relevant and to extent appropriate. Finally, I would add Ben-Gurion has been undergoing difficult political and personal experience (Lavon affairs) and cabinet crisis which has hit him emotionally somewhat harder than one would expect.
I think air at this end with Ben-Gurion is largely cleared.
Re substantive question on a third reactor and or evaluation of the Dimona reactor--Ben-Gurion might agree to a private visit US scientist earlier than a public and open one. Given a little time, I think I could raise this with him at Sde Boker.
Having said this equally clear Ben-Gurion has not been wholly candid in recent discussions, nor in this one. He explained this partly by his concern over guarantees to supplies re Arab boycott and particularly by his comment to me in strict confidence, that he had had to consult with the French government before replying to Secretary.
I pointed out to Ben-Gurion that at December 9 meeting with Secretary suggestion had been made -- which was all that was proper in the circumstances -- that if at all possible Ambassador Harman report back directly to Jones or Farley prior to Secretary's return. (if department wishes to allude to French cooperation on reactor -- I would appreciate it if Ben-Gurion's comments re his recent consultation this regard -- which he said with a finger alongside his nose -- not be attributed directly or indirectly to his conversation with me.)
As instructed, I made point of telling Ben-Gurion Secretary would welcome a visit by Ambassador Harman -- at earliest possible opportunity -- upon his return to provide personal report and any fuller information re above or other questions.
Ben-Gurion initially was a little irked at my urging Mrs Meir -- even as a personal suggestion -- that some kind of answer to questions be forwarded soonest even though we understood Harman might want supply additional details. Fact of matter is, however, that GOI has had ample time to ponder answers to questions and suggestions raised on December 9th, 20th, 2LST, and 24th; and indeed GOI has had to my knowledge at least two recent meetings -- with prime minister present -- on reactor question and replies to us.
Also, in conversations with Mrs Meir (January 3) and during brief chat with Harman (December 3) --it became increasingly evident GOI had still not taken in -- or chosen not to -- seriousness, gravity, and urgency with which USG viewed whole matter. This -- I believe -- is no longer the case.
reid
ms:rjt
1963—Israel buys Yellowcake from Argentina
William Burr and Avner Cohen report that Israel purchased uranium oxide (yellowcake) from Argentina during 1963-1964.
The National Security Archive: The Israel-Argentina Yellowcake Connection
1967—Six Day War

1967—USS Liberty

On June 8, 1967, during the Six-Day War, Israeli jet fighters and torpedo boats attacked the U.S. Navy non-combatant ship USS Liberty. Thirty-four of the ship's crew were killed, and 171 were injured. The ship was heavily damaged and was later scrapped. At the time, Israel was an ally of the United States.
There's compelling evidence that the attack was deliberate, and U.S.officials at the time agreed the attack was deliberate.
ALC Press: June 8 is USS Liberty Remembrance Day
1979—Vela incident

On September 22, 1979, the U.S. Vela 10 satellite detected the telltale "double flash" of a nuclear detonation near the South African territory of Prince Edward Islands in the Indian Ocean. The detonation was almost certainly set off by a joint test by South Africa and Israel.